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ABSTRACT
 
Export Intermediation and the Structure of Industry
 
in Korea and Taiwan
 
National, privately-owned manufacturers of footwear have enjoyed substantial
 
export success in both Korea and Taiwan. But, while the growth of the
 
industry in Korea has been associated with expansion in the size of a
 
relatively small number of firms, expansion in Taiwan has 
been associated
 
with a proliferation in the number of firms.
 
A central hypothesis of the paper is that industrial expansion via an
 
expansion in the number, rather than the size, of firms 
is fuelled by a
 
parallel expansion in the number of traders. A silcple general equilibrium
 
model lays out formally the cumulative, reinforcing character of entry by
 
traders and by small manufacturers. And empirical evidence reveals that, as
 
predicted, the expansion in the number of footwear manufacturers in Taiwan
 
was accompanied by a parallel expansion in the numbec of export traders. In
 
Korea, by contrast, traders failed to play an effective role (at least until
 
the 1980s) with consequent limits on the opportunities for smaller Korean
 
manufacturers.
 
Why did traders play such very different roles in the two countries? The
 
proximate cause lay in the divergent incentives for individual firms to
 
expand, and the consequent different patterns of subdivision among
 
manufacturers of the orders transferred from factories 
in Japan to Korean and 
Taiwanese manufacturers: The Korean -- but not Taiwanese -- government.
 
afforded individual firms substantial incentives for expansion, inducing
 
individual Koruan firms to seek for themselves orders for enormous volumes of
 
footwear, notwithstanding the presence of some, quite marginal, diseconomies
 
of large-scale production. By contrast, the extensive subdivision of orders
 
in Taiwan (but not Korea), and the consequent larger number of
 
manufacturers, reduced the transactions 
costs of trading, and encouraged
 
entry by traders in the former nation.
 
The root cause of differences in the role of traders is to be found in the
 
divergent initial conditions in the two nations. Historical evidence
 
summarized in the paper reveals that Korea was relatively more backward than
 
was Taiwan at the outset of outward-oriented industrialization, with
 
associated higher transaccions cost-, of export intermediation, and a smaller
 
supply of export traders. Viewed from this context, the Korean policies to
 
promote large firms can themselves be viewed as endogenous, as an efficient
 
institutional response to backwardness: in the 
absence of incentives for
 
firms to expand, the Korean footwear industry would have expanded at a slower
 
rate than was in tact achieved.
 
The Korean strategy, however, carries with ic the risk of fuelling a
 
political-economic process characterized by a high degree of rent-seeking,
 
and asso-iated socially unproductive policies. The Taiwanese experience
 
points to another potential response to backwardness: the promotion of
 
traders emerges as a government intervention that might accelerate industrial
 
expansion without .the risk cf rent-seeking, via an increase in the
 
participation by small fizms in industrial exports.
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Export Intermediation and the Structure of Industry
 
in Korea and Taiwan
 
by
 
Brian Levy
 
A recent article by Tibor Scitovsky (1986) highlighted some differences in
 
the size distribution of industrial firms in Korea and Taiwan, and their
 
implications for the patterns of economic development in the two nations. This
 
study reports on field research that explored further the reasons for these 
differences in industry structure. The field research targeted a 
narrowly-defined sector of industry -- footwear -- in which the differences 
were particularly striking, even as national, privately-owned manufacturers in 
both nations enjoyed substanrial export success. 
I
A number of studies have explored comparatively the ways in which
 
differences across cou~itries in the extent of market failure appear to account
 
in part for parallel differences in industry structure. The present study 
focuses on the divergent performance in the two countries of one particular 
market -- the market for export intermediation -- that has not elsewhere been 
identified as an important influence on the structure of industry, but emerged 
quite strongly in the field research as one of a variety of reasons for 
differences in the size distribution of firms in Korea and Taiwan. 2 As is 
explored analytically below, Korea and Taiwan have differed markedly in their 
patterns of expansion over time in the supply of export traderz. The more rapid 
expansion over time in the supply of traders shipping exports from Taiwan than 
For a review of these studies, see Caves (1986)
 
2 For a general discussion of the determinants of firm size in tht:
 
footwear industry, see Levy (1987a).
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from Korea appears to have been associated with lower costs of intermediation,
 
and thus readier access to the kind of heterogenous, small volwiie orders that
 
provide the opportunity for small manufacturers to participate in export
 
markets.
 
The analysis is presented in three 
parts. The first part presents data on
 
the divergent patterns of expansion of the footwear industry Korea
in and
 
Taiwan. The second part lays 
out three hypotheses, related data and 
a formal
 
model that highlights the interdependence between the expansion of 
small
 
manufacturers and independent 
 traders and the ways in which 
 this
 
interdependence can to
impart industrial structure a cumulative, mutually
 
reinforcing character. The third part explores the 
extent to which differences
 
in the patterns of expansion have their roots in the 
 greater relative
 
backwardness of economic
Korea's structure vis a vis Taiwan when the two
 
nations embarked on their post-war drives to industrialization.
 
PATTERNS OF EXPANSION OF THE KOREAN AND TAIWANESE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRIES
 
The footwear industries of both Korea and Taiwan are overwhelmingly outward­
oriented: in 1984 exports accounted for 
over 90 percent of footwear production
 
in Taiwan, and about 70 percent of Korean production.3 As Table 1 reveals, the
 
trajectories 
of export expansion have been remarkably similar in the two
 
nations, with exports of both countries rising from $10 million in 1969, 
to
 
$700-800 million in 1978,. over $1 billion in 1981, and over $2 billion by 1986.
 
Underlying these similar aggregate trajectories are very different patterns
 
3 The Korean estimate, 
 calculated by volume of production, is from

"Footwear Industry: Challenging to Become the World's 
 Top", Korea Trade and
Business, December 1986, p. 5; 
 the Taiwanese estimate was provided by a
leading official of the Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers Association.
 
--------------------------------------------------------
Table 1 -. Value of Footwear Exports from Korea and Taiwan, 
1969-1986 ($ million)
 
Korea Taiwan
 
1969 $ 10 $ 10
 
1970 18 40
 
1971 50 69
 
1972 62 105
 
1973 109 186
 
1974 182 190
 
1975 200 258
 
1976 417 542
 
1977 515 652
 
1978 726 771
 
1979 765 945
 
1980 904 1,411
 
1981 1,049 1,444
 
1982 1,182 1,463
 
1983 1,270 1,886
 
1984 1,398 2,270
 
1985 1,571 2,301
 
1986 2,109 -

Source: Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers Association, Shoe Industry
 
in Taiwan (Taipei, 1986) p. 4; and data provided by Korea
 
Footwear Exporters Association
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of expansion. First, as Table 2 
reveals, while footwear manufacture in Korea
 
has consistently been biased towards large establishments and enterprises,
 
manufacture in Taiwan has been biased smaller in
towards units: 1976
 
establishments4 with 500 or more workers accounted for almost 90 percent of
 
value added in the Korean footwear industry, yet less than 20 percent of value
 
added in Taiwan.
 
Second, while the growth of the 
industry in Korea has been associated with
 
expansion in the size of a relatively small number of firms, expansion in
 
Taiwan has been associated with a proliferation in the number of firms. Thus
 
between 1971 and 1979 the number of Korean exporters of footwear rose from only
 
9 to 19 firms, while (as is detailed in Table 3) the average value of exports
 
per firm rose sevenfold, from $5.6 million 
to $38.2 million per firm. The
 
corresponding number of Taiwanese exporters 
rose from 178 to 563 firms, with
 
the average value of exports rising from $0.4 million to $1.7 million per firm.
 
Third, footwear exports have become increasingly diversified over time in
 
Taiwan, but not Korea. In 1976 vulcanized canvas/rubber running shoes accounted
 
for 40 percent of Korean footwear exports; by 1985, the share of vulcanized
 
shoes had fallen to 12.8 percent of export value; but non-rubber athletic
 
shoes now accounted for an overwhelming 71.3 percent of Korean footwear
 
exports. In Taiwan, by contrast, the extent of specialization has declined over
 
time. In 1971, plastic sandals comprised 40 percent of Taiwan's footwear
 
4 The 
Korean data explicitly treat different establishments under co1mmon
 
ownership as 
distinct units (and thus presumably underestimate the extent of
 
size concentration measured by firm). Although the Taiwanese data 
are purpor­
tedly for enterprise (not establishment) units, they too do not appear to group

multiple enterprises (each typically a single factory) under the control of a
 
single group (outside of Taiwan, such an arrangement would be described a
as 

mnultiplant firm) into a single unit. For all 
 of these ambiguities of
definition, observers of the 
footwear industry in the two countries all report
 
a difference in structure that parallels the evidence in Table 2.
 
Table 2: Value Added in the Footwear Industry in Korea and Taiwan
 
by Size of Enterprise/Establishment,1976 & 1981 (%)
 
1976 
 1981
 
Korea Taiwan' Korea 
 Taiwan
 
5-99 3.2% 
 23.7% 
 6.5% 25.6%
 
100-299 
 3.8 35.4 
 6.9 36.5
 
300-499 3.1 
 21.4 6.1 
 19.4
 
500+ 89.9 19.5 
 80.5 18.5
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 100.0%
 
Source: Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Report on Mining
and Manufacturing Survey, 1976 and 198 
; Republic of China,

Ttrectorata-C"neral'of BRaget, Accounting and Statistics,
 
Executive Yuan, The Report on the Industrial and Commercial
 
Census,
-
Taiwan-Fukien Area, 1976 and 1981
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Table 3 _: Avarage Value of Exports per Footwear Manufacturer in Korea
 
and Taiwan, 1969-1986 ($ million)
 
Korea Taiwan
 
1969 
 $0 1
 
1970 
 0.5 
1971 $ 5.6 0.4 
1972 6.9 0.4 
1973 9.9 0.7 
1974 14.0 0.7 
1975 12.5 0.8 
1976 23.2 1.6 
1977 27.1 1.3 
1978 38.2 1.4 
1979 38.2 1.7 
1980 36.1 2.4 
1981 30.9 2.0 
1982 28.8 1.9 
1983 25.4 2.1 
1984 24.1 2.1 
1985 23.1 2.0
 
1986 25.4
 
Sources: As in Table i; and unpublished data on numbers of members, provided 
by Korea Footwear Exporters Association; and Ministry of Commerce
 
and Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers Association, Analysis of Footwear
 
Industry (Taipei, 1986) p. 59
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exports. By 1985 the leading export item (non-rubber athletic footwear, as in
 
Korea) accounted for just 27.5 percent of footwear exports, with the 
next
 
five 5 items providing an additional 42.4 percent of the total. The remaining 30
 
percent of exports was comprised of dozens of distinct items, no one of which
 
accounted for more than 3 percent of total exports. 6
 
Differences in the mix of footwear produced in Korea and Taiwan point to a
 
superficially appealing, but ultimately unhelpful, explanation for the
 
divergent structures of the footwear industry in the two countries: that the
 
efficient scale of production varies across different segments of the footwear
 
market, with Korea specializing in the production of shoes for which efficient
 
scale is large, and Taiwan specializing in the production of shoes for which
 
efficient scale is small.
 
There are two major shortcomings of using the technical characteristics of
 
production to account for differences in the structure of the footwear industry
 
in the two countries. First, as is detailed in a companion paper (Levy, 1987),
 
field visits to more than a dozen footwear factories of varying sizes, as well
 
as interpretive analysis of data on the evolution of the size of footwear
 
manufacturers in the two countries, failed to uncover any evidence of
 
sigrificant differences across types of footwear in the efficicnt scale of
 
production. On the contrary, the athletic shoes that were key items of
 
production in both countries were produced in small factories in Taiwan, and in
 
5 The five items are plastic casual shoes (11.5% of exports), vulcanized
 
canvas/rubber shoes (9.2%), special plastic shoes (7.5%), plastic sandals
 
(7.2%) and plastic high-heel shoes (7.0%). In all, plastic footwear of various
 
varieties accounted for 52.8% of Taiwan's footwear exports.
 
6 The Taiwanese data are from Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers AssociatioL,
 
Analysis of the Footwear Industry (Taipei: 1986) pp. 7, lo; the Korean data
 
are frown "Challenging to Become World's Top"
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large establishments in Korea. Indeed, if anything, the conclusion drawn from
 
field visits was that beyond four or so production lines for 'footwear
 
'lasting' 
 (the assembly of uppers and soles) 7 , footwear manufacture is
 
characterized by some (quite limited) diseconomies of scale. 8
 
The second limitation of an effort to explain differences in the Korean and
 
Taiwanese 
industry structure by taking as a starting point differences in
 
product mix and thence in the technical characteristics of production is its
 
circularity: such an explanation treats as exogenous a difference between the
 
two countries that itself needs 
to be explained as an endogenous variable in
 
a more complete model. It is to the specification of such a model -- a model 
in which the role of export traders is accorded a central position -- to 
which we now turn. 
7 Some, but not all, footwear factories also are vertically integrated

into the -manufacture of soles, and the cutting and stitching of footwear
 
uppers. For an analysis of the determinants of vertical integration, see Levy
 
(1987)
 
8 For additional evidence of the absence of 
scale economies in the
 
footwear industry, see C.F. Pratten, Economies 
of Scale in Manufacturing
 
Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), quoted in Gillis,
 
Perkins, Roemer and Snodgrass, Economics of Development (Norton: 1983) p. 550.
 
It is worth noting explicitly the relationship between learning-by doing and
 
the efficient scale of production. Obviously, learning-by-doing and the costs
 
of downtime imply that there are efficiency advantages in maintaining the same
 
shoe on an individual production line 
for the maximum pe.riod attainable given

the lead time for an order. However, the economies derived from increasing
 
production on a single line are quite different from the economies (or, in the
 
present case, diseconomies) associated with increasing the number of production

lines. Assuming 50-60,000 pairs of shoes per line per month, a four line 
factory can produce 200-250,000 shoes monthly With a two-month lead time 
available for production (a span that is in excess of what is available for 
most orders as of the mid 1980s), a four line factory has the capability of 
producing order volumes of no more than 500,000 pairs -- even assuming that it 
is willing to risk producing exclusively for a single buyer. At their peak,

wholesalers of athletic footwear such as 
NIKE and REEBOK were procuring from
 
Korea alone as much as 4 million pairs of shoes in a single month.
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EXPORT INTERMEDIATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY IN KOREA AND TAIWAN
 
The development of a model proceeds in two stages. The first stage details
 
three hypotheses, together with data on the salience of these hypotheses in the
 
context of Korea and Taiwian. The second stage lays out a simple geiieral
 
equilibrium model that formalizes the interaction among the varial[les
 
highlighted by the hypotheses.
 
The Divergent Patterns of Intermediation: Three Hypotheses
 
The interaction of traders and small manufacturers. A central hypothesis of
 
this paper is that industrial expansion via an expansion in the number, rather
 
than the size, of firms is fuelled by a parallel expansion in the number of
 
traders. The corollary follows that very differenc patterns of intermediation
 
drove the divergent patterns of expansion in the two countries. In particular,
 
the hypothesis implies that the expansion in footwear exports was driven in
 
Taiwan by a cumulative, mutually reinforcing expansion in the nunber of
 
traders and small manufacturers. In Korea, by contrast, traders failed to play
 
an effective role (at least until the early 1980s) and as a consequence export
 
opportunities were more limited for smaller Korean manufacturers than for their
 
Taiwanese counterparts.
 
The available data, for all of their limitations, appear to be consistent
 
with this first hypothesis. Differences between Korea and Taiwan in the numbers
 
of footwear manufacturers over the course of the 1970s havi. already been
 
suimarized. The difference persisted in the 1980s: as of 1985, there were 1,140
 
registered manufacturers of footwear for export in Taiwan, but only 68
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manufacturers in Korea.9 Evidence on the numbers of manufacturers over time is 
not, of course, sufficient to illustrate a cumulative pattern of expansion 
via the interaction of entry by traders and by manufacturers. And available 
evidence on the role of traders is not as detailed as might be desired. 
Nonetheless, the data on traders provide some indication of their divergent 
roles in the two nations. 
The extent of unreliability of the estimates of the numbers of export
 
traders in footwear over tire for Taiwan in particular is evident in the notes
 
to Table 4; for example, while the estimate calculated from published sources
 
put the number of export traders in footwear in Taiwan iii 1984 at 300, a senior
 
official of the Taiwan Footweqr Manufacturers Association estimated that
 
approximately 2,000 traders exported footwear from that island. The total
 
number of export traders over time in each nation must, perforce, serve as the
 
best available proxy. The data in Table 4 on the membership over time of the
 
Korea Traders Association appear to approximate reasonably an upper bound on
 
the actual number of export traders from that nation.10 The estimates based on
 
membership of the Association of Taiwanese Importers and Exporters were less
 
helpful.11 Indeed, for Taiwan only the census totals subsequent to 1973 appear
 
9 Estimates of the number of exporters in each country for each year
 
between 1971 and 1985 can readily be calculated from Tables i and 2.
 
10 Manufacturers as well a; importers and exporters are permitted to join
 
the Korea Traders Association (KTA); and only members of the KTA are permitted
 
to operate as export traders. It was not clear whether foreign traders with
 
offices in Korea were required to register as members of the KTA. Table 10
 
below provides some independent evidence on the role of foreign traders.
 
11 While (as in Korea) manufacturers have the right to become members,
 
unlike Korea membership of the association is not mandatory for export traders.
 
Table 4: 
Numbers of Traders In Korea and Taiwan, Selected Years
 
Year Korea / Taiwan 
Footwear Total Footwear2/3otal i2/ Total II4 
1947 
1950 
1960 
-
-
-
-
-
351 
1,051 
18 
32 
1970 
1972 
1973 
1975 
1977 
18 
19 
28 
39 
--
-
1,200 
1,900 
-
67 
98 
-2,777 
105 
1,287 
2,491 
2,965 
4,046 
165 
1,286 
_ 
4,430 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
43 
168 
159 
2,300 
3,500 
5,300 
5 
73 
3 
300 
-
-
5,573 
7,258 
7,051 
8,899 
13,320.. 
14:117/ 
20,597 
Sources: Data supplied by Korea Traders Association and Importers and
Exporters Association of Taiwan; Republic of China,Executive
Yuan,Directorate-Ceneral of Budget,Accounting and Statistics,
The Report on 1981 Industrial and Commercial Census Taiwan-
Fukien Area,The Republic of China volume VI,1981 pp.156-157;
Republic of China,Ministry of Finance,Monthl> Bulletin of
 
Financial Statistics,1987,p.94
 
Notes:l/ Members of the Korea Traders Association; Membership of the
trade i'ssociation includes those manufacturers who choose to
Join as well as 
import and exnnrt traders. Only enterprises that
are members of 
the Korea Traders Associatior are permitted to
 
to operate as export tralers
 
2/ Members of Importers and Exporters Association of Taiwan; Membership

of the trade association includes those manufacturers who choose
to join as well aa 
import and export traders. In Taiwan,only
those traders witi assets in excess 
of NT $2 million are eligible to
Join the Importers and Exporters Association; non-members are
 
not barred from engaging in export trade
3/ Those members'of the respective associations that explicitly listed
footwear exports as 
a line of business
 
4/ Data are 
from Republic of China,Tndustrial and Commercial Census:
prior to 
1976,data are estimates reconstructed from incomplete
prior censuses; data measure number of traders engaged in exports
 
5/ The number of firms listed urder the category "footwear,excopt
plastic shoes,rubber boots and canvas shoes"(the only export
category that made explicit reference to footwear in 1980 and 1984)

6/ An informal estimate, by a senior official of the Taiwan Footwear
Manufacturers Association put the total number of footwear export

traders at 2,000
 
7/ Data for 1982 and 1984 are 
from Republic of China,Monthly Bulletin
 
of Financial Statistics
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moderately reliable. 12 Yet for all of these difficulties with data, Table 4
 
points to both a consistently larger number of traders in Taiwan than in Korea
 
and -- notably in the more reliable post-1973 estimates -- an exceedingly rapid
 
expansion in the number of traders in the former nation.
 
The cumulative divergence in the, roles of traaers over time in the Zwo
 
nations is more clearly evident in Table 5. As that table reveals, in Taiwan-­
but not Korea -- the expansion in the number of traders kept pace with the 
overall expansion of manufactures exports: whereas the average value of 
industria. exports per Taiwanese trader altered hardly at all between 1973 and 
1984, the average export value of Korean trad'.rs increased by almost three-fold 
between 1973 and 1980, declining somewhat thereafter. 
Evidence of divergent patterns of participation by traders is not, to be 
sure, a sufficient basis for confidence' in the plausibility of the hypothesis 
that divergent patterns of intermediation underlie the divergent patterns of 
expansion of the footwear (and other similar) industries in Korea and Taiwan. 
The formal model, developed below, provides further grounds for confidence: 
the model demonstrates how (as in Taiwan) a proliferation of traders can 
provide small manufacturers with increasing access over time not only to orders 
for standardized types of shoes, but also to orders for small heterogenous 
lots of footwear. As the model explores, in the absence of such traders, a
 
nation's footwear industry is dependent for its expansion on continuing inflows
 
of orders of large volume for standardized types of shoes.
 
The determinants of entry by traders. Why did traders play such very
 
different roles in the two countries? In general terms, the hypothesis
 
12 But Cho (1987) makes reference to a 1982 estimate of over 30,000
 
Taiwanese traders.
 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5 : Average Value of Industrial Ex orts per Export Trader in
 
Korea and Taiwan, 1973-1984 ($ million) 
Korea Taiwanl/ 
1973 $2.4 $1.4 
1975 2.5 1.0 
1978 1.3 
1980 7.0 1.3 
1982 5.8 1.5 
1984 5.2 1.4 
Sources: Republic of China, Council fcr Economic Planning and Development,
 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1986 (Taipei) p. 207; Republic of
 
Korea, Economic Planning Board, Iiajor Statistics of Korean
 
Economy,.1936 (Seoul) p. 225; and sources in Table
 
Notes : 1/ export trader data are from "Total II" in Table 4.
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explored in this paper is that differences in the roles of traders can be
 
traced to differcnces between Korea and Taiwan in the transactions costs of
 
intermediation between traders and manufacturers. A subsequent section of the
 
paper explores in some detail the character of the transactions costs of
 
intermediation and their relationship to the divergent initial conditions
 
prevailing in the two nations. What will suffice for now is the hypothesis that
 
the incentive of traders to source orders from a particular nation is a
 
function of the number of manufacturers in that nation: the larger is the
 
number of manufacturers of footwear, the more readily will intermediaries
 
idercify firms willing to fulfil their orderz, and thus the lower will be the
 
transactions costs of trading. Empirically, this hypothesis implies that the
 
differential role of traders has its origin in differential degrees of
 
subdivision among manufacturers of the orders transferred from factories in
 
Japan to Korean and Taiwanese manufacturers. The formal model will illustrate
 
how different degrees of subdivision might have set in motion the divergent,
 
subsequent patterns of expansion delineated in the first hypothesis. Here we
 
focus on the empirical evidence as to differences in the degree of subdivision.
 
In both Korea and Taiwan, the decision in the 1960s by the major Japanese
 
trading companies to relocate the manufacture of footwear for the USA market
 
from Japan represented the primary impetus1 3 for the expansion of footwear
 
exports. Within a few years the Japanese had subdivided their orders in Taiwan:
 
by 1971, 50-70 Taiwanese factories were producing plastic footwear for export
 
13 A fundamental impetus for export expansion was of course the guneral 
shift to outward-oriented policies in both nations. See Levy (1986) for a 
review of these policies. 
10
 
1 4 
by the Japanese traders. But there was no parallel subdivision in Korea: as
 
late as 1979 five leading firms accounted for 64 percent of all footwear
 
exports from Korea. Indeed, as of 1975, a single Korean firm earned revenues of
 
$100 million for its manufacture of footwear for Mitsubishi, the largest
 
exporter of shoes to the USA among the Japanese. The fulfillment of an order on
 
this scale required the full-time operation of over 50 production lines;15 even
 
in 1985, eight lines was the maximum for any Taiwanese factGry. 1 6 The single
 
largest customers for two other large Korean firms for which information is
 
available placed orders that in the mid-1970s 
ranged in value from $15-$20
 
million annually; each firm devoted a minimum of 18 lines exclusively to these
 
single customers.
 
The role of initial conditions. Why were the patterns of subdivision of
 
orders for large volumes so very different in Korea and Taiwan? As will be
 
explored in somewhat more detail below, the proximate cause appears to have 
been the very different incentives for expansion afforded firms by the Korean 
and Taiwanese governments in the context of an industry characterized by some, 
quite marginal, diseconomies of large-scale production. However -- and this is 
the third large hypothesis of the study, to be explored in a subsequent 
section of this paper -- the differences in policy appear to have themselves 
14 Reported by 
a senior official of the Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers
 
Association, himself a manufacturer in that early period.
 
15 Reported by a senior executive of the Korean company. The number of
 
lines is calculated by assuming an fob price of $3.00 per pair of shoes, and
 
production of 2,000 pairs 
per line per day. At its peak in the late 1970s, the
 
company was operating 118 production lines.
 
16 Reported in Table 54, Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers Association,
 
Analysis of Footwear Industry (Taipei, 1986), p. 81. There 
are a number of
 
multi-factory footwear groups in Taiwan; but the largest of these controls only
 
25 lines.
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been endogenou3: the incentives afforded Korean firms to expand can be viewed 
as an efficient institutional response to the relative backwardness of Korea's 
economic structure -- and a series of associated market failures, not least in 
the market for export intermediaries -- relative to Taiwan at the outset of 
the two nations postwar drives to expansion. 
A General Equilibrium 
Figures l(a) and l(c) distinguish between two submarkets for footwear. One
 
distinction between the submarkets is in their types of orders: Figure l(a)
 
depicts the submarket for small-lot, heterogenous orders of specialized shoes,
 
and Figure l(c) the submarket for standardized, homogenous shoes in which 
individual orders are for large volumes.
 
A second distinction is in the mLchanisms of procurement by buyers. Buyers 
can choose either to purchase ft )twear directly from manufacturers, or to
 
purchase through intermediaries. Direct purchases necessarily involve th- fixes
 
costs of learning about doing business in the exporting nation, and
 
establishing the requisite channels. Thus buyers of heterogenous, small-lot
 
orders (for whom the formal costs of direct purchase are likely to be large
 
relative to the size of their operations) are presumed to channel their 
purchases through traders who perform the function of intermediating between
 
purchaser and manufacturer. 1 7 Large volume purchases from manufacturers of
 
17 If the total cost of purchase through intermediation (TCl) - PQ - kQ 
and total costs of direct pt-rchase (2C2) - PQ + Z, then 
TC < TC2
 
iff Q < Z/k. 
Thus Q* - Z/k represents the volume at which buyers shift from indirect to 
direct purchase.
 
Figure . 
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shoes of homogenous designs are more likely to be made directly.1 8
 
A third distinction between the two submarkets is in the size of
 
manufacturing enterprises. Assume that the transactions costs of dealing with
 
buyers increase proportionately with the number of orders and the number of
 
buyers, and are invariant with respect to the volume of individual orders. It
 
follows that large firms -- with a scarce supply of managerial resources -­
will prefer a relatively small number of large, homogenous orders to a large 
number of small orders. Conversely, it is taken to be true by definition that
 
individual small firms cannot handle large orders. 19 Assume for convenience
 
that manufacturers of footwear must be one of two sizes (measured by their
 
volume of production): "small" or "large". Assume further that the minimum size
 
of orders that large firms accept is sufficiently large that all of their
 
orders are for standardized types of shoes. It follows that the subwarket for
 
heterogenous footwear depicted in Figure l(a) is dominated exclusively by small
 
manufacturers, in principle, both small and large firms can participate in the
 
submarket for standardized shoes depicted in Figure l(b); as will be explored 
in more detail below, whether that market is dominated by small or large firms
 
depends on the extent to which orders for large volumes are subdivided among 
multiple manufacturers. 20
 
18 The model presumes for simplicity that all large-volume orders are
 
procured directly. Note, however, the possibility that if intermediation
 
services are competitively priced, some large ord(rs may also be channelled
 
through traders.
 
19 Insofar as it is prudent practice for small firms to diversify their
 
sources of business -- and interviews suggested that must firms indeed sought 
such diversification 
-- the maximum sized order that a small firm will handle
 
will be below its potential capacity.
 
20 Note that even in the absence of the strong assumptions in the text, 
givun that direct orders are larger than orders through intermediaries, and 
given some correlation between firm size and preferred order size, the 
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One final assumption -- that the supply curve for footwear is perfectly 
elastic at a factory gate price of P121 -- is needed prior to laying out the 
simple general equilibrium model underlying Figure 1. Underlying this 
assumption are two subsidiary propositions: that -- as summarized earlier-­
beyond a relatively modest volume, production is characterized by some (quite 
limited) diseconomies of scale; and that in both Korea and Taiwan there are
 
large numbers of potential small and medium-sized entrants into the industry at
 
the prevailing price of footwear.22
 
DID 1 in Figure l(a) represents the summation of the marginal values of
 
additional purchases for each of the buyers of heterogenous footwear items from
 
an individual exporting nation.2 3 DIDI, however, represents nominal demand (Dx)
 
rather than effective demand (Dn) as transmitted to manufacturers, insofar as
 
intermediaries receive payment, kl, per unit purchased; the effective demand
 
proportion of orders channelled through intermediaries that goes to large firms
 
will be lower than the proportion of direct purchases that goes to large
 
firms.
 
21 It is perhaps worth noting here that in the face of 30 per-!ent real
 
annual growth in export sales over a fifteen year period, an assurption of
 
perfect elasticity does not necessarily do as much violence to reality as it
 
might in other contexts.
 
22 Along with its importance for the assumption of perfect supply
 
elasticity, the proposition of large numbers of potential entrants excludes a
 
priori the hypothesis chat differences in entrepreneurial supply functions
 
account for differences in the roles of small and medium firms in the two
 
nations, an hypothesis that is in some sense a confession of ignorance to
as 

the determinants of industry structure.
 
'
23 It might be objected that r - foreign demand for footwear (or indeed 
for any traded item) faced by an individual nation is perfectly elastic, at the 
price prevailing on the international market. The rationale for the downward 
sloping function is that buyers trade off at least to some degree the objective

of minimizing price with the objective of limiting risk, by diversifying their
 
sources of supply. Since manufacturers in both Korea and Taiwan are efficient
 
producers, and their export prices are in a similar range, it seems appropriate
 
to take the demand function to be downward-sloping.
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for purchases of heterogenous orders is D2D2 . Formally, then,
 
Dn - Dn(k, Dx) d/dk<O; d/dDx>O. (1)
 
Figure l(b) illustrates how k is determined. The demand for trading services,24
 
Dt - Dt(k, Dx) d/dk<O; d/dDx>O (2)
 
is a function of the cost of these services, k, and the nominal demand function
 
for footwear purchases.
 
On the supply side, we define a trader supply function 25
 
SI - Sl(k, TC, H) d/dk>O; d/dTC<O (3)
 
where
 
TC - transactions costs of trading;
 
H - relevant historical features of the
 
exporting nation that have influenced
 
the supply of traders;
 
The functional determinants of TC can in turn be written as
 
TC - TC(M, X) d/dM<O (4)
 
where
 
M - number of manufacturers;
 
X - a vector of other influences on
 
transactions costs
 
The nature and impact of variables H and X will be considered later. As for
 
M, as outlined earlier the hypothesis here is that the larger is the nusuber of
 
potential manufacture.s of footwear, the more readily will intermediaries
 
24 The demand function, Dt, in Figure l(b) maps the total effect of a 
change in k on demand for trading services -- both the direct price effect, 
and the indirect effect of a change in k on effective demand for footwear. 
25 As is clarifi.ed further in the formal analysis below, SI in Figure 1(b) 
represents the total effect of a change in Icon the supply of trading services 
-- both the direct price effect, and the indirect effect of a change in k on 
the demand for footwear, and thence on the number of manufacturers and on 
transactions costs. 
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identify firms willing to fulfil their orders, and thus the lower will be the
 
transactions costs of trading. The number of manufacturers is in turn
 
determined by
 
M - M(Mo, Dn) d/dM0 , d/dDn > 0 (5)
 
where
 
M0 - the number of manufacturers engaged
 
in production of large volume orders
 
of standardized footwear products.
 
Finally, the system is closed by the equilibrium condition
 
Dt - S1. (6)
 
Figure I includes two further diagrams. Figure l(d) contains industry supply
 
and demand functions, in which D4,D4 is the horizontal sum of D2D2 and D3D3 . And
 
Figure l(e) is a summary of the different ways in which large volume orders of
 
a given size might be subdivided; q represents the volume of production per
 
+
manufacturer, and M the number of manufacturers.2 6 Ql, Q2, Q3 (- QI Q2), kl,
 
ql and Ml represent an ini:.ial equilibrium for the system.
 
In what way does the general equilibrium model help reveal the divergent
 
dynamics of expansion of the Korean and Taiwanese footwear industries? Recall
 
that the primary impetus for the expansion of footwear exports from both Korea
 
and Taiwan was the decision by Japanese trading companies to relocate their
 
large-volume orders, targeted for sale in the USA, to these countries. This
 
upsurge in orders can be characterized as a shift in demand from D3D3 to
 
D5D in figure 1(c), and thus to D6D6 in figure l(d). The new equilibrium
 
volume of large orders is Q4, and of total production is Q5 (- QI + Q4). if-­
26 Given our simplifying assumption that firms must produce at one of two
 
voluines, q is constrained to take on the values of ql and q2. Readers offended
 
by loose ends of unfilled orders can add the assumption that all orders for
 
large volumes are some multiple of ql and q2.
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as in Korea -- all of the increment in large orders is placed with existing 
firms, the equilibrium combination in figure 1(e) shifts from Mlq I to Mlq 2 with
 
no further consequences. If, however, the increment is placed in Taiwan
-- as 
-- entirely new -- if, the firms therewith firms say, all new produced ql, 

would be M2 - new entrants -- then a cumulative process of expansion will 
result; Figurc 1 provides a comparative static illustration.
 
Recall that the number of manufacturers, M, entered as an argument in the
 
trading supply function in equation (3). If the expansion in production from Q3
 
to Q5 is met by an increase in the nunber of manufacturers from MI to M2 , the
 
supply function of trading services in Figure 1(b) will shift from SIS I to 
SJSJ with a consequent reduction in k, from kI to k3 . The fall in k implies in
 
turn that D2D2 in figure l(a) shifts outward -- to D7D7 -- as the effective 
demand for low volume, heterogenous items of footwear rises in response to the 
lower cost of intermediation. The shift to -- and thisD7D7 to total demand 
function D8D8 -- implies an expansion in total production, to Q6 in Figure 
1(c). If this expansion is met by a further increase in the number of
 
manufacturers, the entire process continues ...... until the entry 
of new
 
manufacturers has further on the costs
no impact of intermediation. The data
 
in Tables 3, 4 and 5 delineating the pattern of expansion of the Taiwanese
 
footwear industry are consistent with the cumulative process implied by the
 
model. By contrast, the data for Korea are consistent with a pattern of
 
expansion dependent on the expansion of orders for large volumes with no
 
subdivision of these orders among manufacturers, and hardly at all (at least
 
until the 1980s) on small-lot heterogenous orders of the kind that are most
 
efficiently channelled through traders.
 
Formally, the comparative statics of the general equilibrium system can be
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solved as follows. By substitution of equations (1) - (5) into equation (6) 
Sl[k, H, TC(X, M(M0 , Dn[k, Dx])) ] - Dt[k, Dn(k, Dx)] (7)
 
Totally differentiating (7) and calculating dk/dM0 -- the general equilibrium
 
impact of an increase in the number of manufacturers via the direct purchase
 
market on the market for intermediation -- yields:
 
dk [SI + dSl dTC dM dDn dDt dDt dDi] - I dTC dM 
dMo k dTC dM dDn dk dk dDndkJ LdT dM 
Given either the assumption of a positively sloped trader supply function,27
 
or the weaker assumption-of a stable convergence of the system of equations to
 
equilibrium,28 the sign of dk,/Mno can readily be calculated from equation (8)
 
to be negative.
 
THE IMPACT OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
 
The formal model has illustrated how divergent patterns of expansion of
 
their footwear industries might have followed from differential degrees of
 
subdivision among of the orders Lransferred to Korea and Taiwan from factories
 
in Japan. It was suggested earlier that divergent incentives for expansion
 
represented the proximate cause for the different degrees of subdivision. This
 
27 dSl/dk represents the (positive) direct effect of the price of 
intermediation on the supply of traders. (dSI/dTC)(dTC/dM)(dM/dDn)(dDn/dk) 
represents the negative indirect effect of the price of intermediation on 
trader supply; that is, the effect via the impact of k on effective demand for 
footwear and thence on the number of manufacturers and the transactions costs 
of trading. As long as the former effect is greater than the latter, the trader 
supply function will be positively sloped -- and the left-hand-side bracketed 
term of equation (8) will have the necessary positive sign. 
28 Even if, contrary to the assumption in footnote 17 above, the slope of
 
S, is negative, Figure l(b) will converge to equilibrium following a shift in
 
SI 
as long as the slope of DI is greater than the slope of SI . Since the slope
 
of D is ((dDt/dk) + (dDt/dDn)(dDn/dk)) the condition of stability is sufficient
 
to ensure that the left hand side bracketed term of equation (8) has the
 
necessary positive sign.
 
18
 
paper is not the place to compare the patterns of incentives in the two
 
countries in any detail; rather, a few summary observations must suffice.
 
First, the incentives in Korea favoring the expansion of firms can be traced
 
to the characteristics 
of that nation's formal credit markets, in particular
 
the high levels of control, and associated rationing of credit, by the Korean
 
government. Second, the 
 automatic provision on concessional terms of short­
term working finance for exports occupied a special position amidst the
 
panoply of rationed credit in Korea, providing firms with an opportunity to
 
earn rents in financial markets by expanding their exports. Third, the special
 
prestige associated with export performance opened the door to a host of
 
additional rationed credit and tax concessions for successful Korean
 
exporters. 29 In the face of these incentives, the lure for individual Korean
 
firms to take for themselves orders for enormous volumes in the footwear
 
indusry -- an industry in which the technological demands of production were 
small, and the up-front investment costs low -- proved irresistable. 
Prudence suggests it might be well to ascribe the patterns of incentives 
prevailing in Korea in the late 1960s and early 1970s to the distinctive 
(exogenously determined) preferences of President Park and his policy advisers, 
and declare the analysis complete at this point. Instead, imprudently, this
 
paper probes further, exploring how the Korean policies to promote large
 
firms might themselves be viewed as endogenous, as an efficient institutional
 
response to the relative backwardness of that nation's economic structure as it
 
29 For discussions of the Korean financial system, and the ways in
 
which governent used finance as a mechanism of control, see 
Cole and Park
 
(1983), and Jones and Sakong 
(1980). For an analysis of thu relationship
 
between access to working finance and the decision to export, see Park
 
(1983), pp. 41-50. For a more detailed review by the present author, see Levy
 
(1987).
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embarked upon the path of outward-oriented industrialization.3 0 In particular,
 
we shall explore the extent to which Korea's backwardness relative to Taiwan
 
might plausibly have been accompanied by higher transactions costs of export
 
intermediation. Such an association points to the possibility that, in the
 
absence of incentives for firms to expand, the Korean footwear industry would
 
not have expanded r.t the same rate, along the same pattern, as did the 
Taiwanese industry. Rather, the result would have been a slower rate of Korean
 
expansion than was in fact achieved.
 
Differences in Initial Conditions
 
Tables 6 and 7 offer evidence of the disparity in initial conditions at the
 
outset of the enormously successful post-war drives to industrialization of
 
Korea and Taiwan. As Table 6 reveals, Taiwan's per capita GNP in 1955 was more
 
than 70 percent above that of Korea's; indeed, in real terms it was only at the
 
close of the 1960s that Korea's per capita income exceeded the level in Taiwan
 
in 1955. At least as striking is the disparity evident in Table 7 betwaen
 
levels cf education in the two societies: in 1960 the percentage of Taiwanese
 
above the age of six with twelve or more years of schooling was almost three
 
times that of Korea. Indeed, only in the late 1970s did the absolute nwnber of
 
Koreans with twelve or more years of education first exceed the number in
 
Taiwan.
 
There are (at least) three sets of reasons for the disparity evident in
 
Tables 6 and 7. First, by 1950 Taiwan had secured the political stability
 
necessary for economic development; but it was only a decade later -- after the
 
30 For the seminal article on institutional responses to relative
 
backwardness, see Gerschenkron (1961).
 
Table 6: 
Real Incomes Per Capita in Korea and Taiwan (in constant 1965 $)
 
Korea Taiwan
 
1. CNP per capita (in constant
 
1965 US $ )
 
1955 
 $ 81 $ 140
 
1960 
 95 157
 
1965 
 103 216
 
1970 150 312
 
2. Total Population (millions)
 
1955 21.5 9.1
 
1960 25.0 10.8
 
1970 
 31.5 14.7
 
Sources: Republic of China, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan
 
Statistical Data Book, 1986 (Taipei); Republic of Korea, Economic 
Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook (various years); Republic
of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Korea Economy 
Table 7: Proportions of the Populations over Six Years of Age in Korea and 
Taiwan with Twelve or More Years of Education (F0r0sand %)
 
Korea Taiwan 
1952 - 650 (10.2%) 
1960 1,038 ( 5.3%) 1,207 (14.2 ) 
1965 - 1,788 (17.4 ) 
1970 2,729 (10.4 ) 3,740 (30.2 ) 
1975 3,856 (13.1 ) 4,956 (35.4 ) 
Sources: Republic of China, Council for Economic Planning and Development,
 
Taiwan Statistical bata Book, 1986 (Taipei); Republic of Korea,
 
Economic Planning Board, National Bureau of Statistics, Population
 
and Housing Census Report (1960, 1970, 1975)
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Korean war and subsejuenr. domestic political turmoil 
-- that political
 
conditions conducive to economic development were in place.
 
The second set of reasons has 
to do with the inflow of mainlanders into
 
Taiwan subsequent to the communist revolution of 1949. One direct consequence
 
of the inflow was 
the transfer to Taiwan of the sophisticated business skills
 
of a portion of the Shanghai business elite. A second consequence was the
 
continued governance of Taiwan by an administrative elite from the mainland.
 
The political dominance of the Kuomintang elite ensured that the attention of
 
the elite of pre-1949 Taiwanese society remained focused (as it had been during
 
the period of Japanese occupation) on economic rather than political
 
3 1 
concerns. By contrast, in response to the vacuum 
left by the Japanese
 
withdrawal, and in the 
context of a culture steeped in Confucian values, a
 
significant number of the most educated and influential Koreans were drawn
 
irresistibly into politics and goverrnent.
 
Finally, there appear to have been substantial differences in the endowments
 
of human capital in each country at 
the close of their common period of
 
occupation by the Japanese, even prior to 
the influx of mainlanders into
 
Taiwan. 
As Table 8 suggests, during the period of occupation a higher
 
proportion of tne economically active population appears to have been engaged
 
in commerce in Taiwan than in Korea; 
indeed the data .n Table 9 suggest that it
 
was only in the 19 60s that (measured as the share of total employed)
 
comiuercial activity in Korea reached a level enjoyed by Taiwan already in 1930.
 
Although data are not available for the nineteenth century, it 's noteworthy
 
that at a time when Korea was only gradually emerging from its two-hundred year 
31 For a discussion of the evolution of the Taiwanese economic elite, 
see
 
Thomas Cold (1981).
 
Table 8: 	Number of People Engaged in Commerce in Korea and Taiwan, 1905-19&l/
 
('000s of people; and percentage of economically active population
 
Korea 	 Taiwan
 
1905 
 872/ (6.2%)3
1920 
 1022/ (6.3 )1930 
 5/6/2/ 4/
1938 
 5467/1 (5.6%)1949 370"" (4.7 )1953 4059/ (5.6) 3108/' (10..6)1960 
 586 

1964 	 (6.9 ) 346 (10.0) 
.
 86310/ (11.1) 
 350 ( 9.6) 
Sources: 	Chou Chien Wen, Taiwan Economy from 1895 to 1945 (Taipei: Taiwan Kai

Ming Books, 1980); Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book
Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Kirea Statistical Yearbook
 
Rcpublic of Korea, Population and Housing Census Report, 1960
 
Notes : 	/ The various sources from which the data 
are taken do not always

offer consistent, explicit or precise definitions of the commercial

sector. Where possible, I have endeavored to organize the data on
the basis of a consistent definition of employment in 
commerce 	as
the sum of employment in wholesale and retail trade, in hotels and
 
restaurants, and in finance.
 
2/ 	Taiwanese only; excludes those Japanese resident in Taiwan that
 
were employed in commerce
 
3/ 	Percentage of total employed; for 1905, 
1920 and 1930 'total

employed' in Taiwan is taken to be the total non-dependent

population (that is, 
the total population excluding children
 
and aged).
 
4/ An estimate of 'total employed' is not available for 1930; 
the
 percentage for that year is calculated on the conservative

assumption that 
the ratio of total employed to total population
is 43.0% -- the lowest observed ratio for the 1905, 1915 
(not

showrn) and 1920 estimates
 
5/ For North plus South Korea
 
6/ Includes those Japanese resident In Korea that 
were engaged
 
in commerce
 
7/ South 	Korea only, for this and subsequent estimates
 
Table 8: Notes (ctd)
 
8/ The first estimate taken from the Taiwan Statistical Data Book,, p. 15;
(which does not explicitly define.'what is included in the category

1commerce'). A lower estimate of 135,000 was 
reported in u. 1954
Census. But that 
census used a significa..tly narrower definition
 
of commerce, and did not include those rmnloyed in restaurants,

hotels or finance, 
nor fixed stalls end hawkers with licenses.
 
9/ Estimate from 1960 population census; a published estimate in the
 
1961 Korea Statistical Yearbook of wholesale and retail trade
 (including restaurants and hotels) plus tinance was 534,000 people.

10/ The estimate is taken 
from the 1965 Korea Statistical Yearbook. It
is not clear whether the sharp increase over 1960 is real or an

artifact of a new source of estimation. However, the existence of
two similar estimates for 1960 from independent sources (see note 9),

and a parallel di3continuity in the 1960 and 1963 (and '64) estimates

of 'sales workers' (not shown in Table 8; estimates of sales workers
between 1957 and 1970 track closely estimates of the numbers employed
in commerce over the 
same period) add to the likelihood that the
increase signifies real changes in the pattern of economic activity.
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status as the "Hermit Kingdom" and, in the absence of a fully monetized
 
economy, depended in part on barter as a vehicle for domestic trade, 32 Taiwan
 
was rapidly being settled by migrants from the Southern coastal province of
 
Fukien, a province located between the major trading ports of Hong Kong and
 
Shanghai. Although the migrants for the most part were poor peasants in search
 
of land to till, the historical record reveals quite substantial trading
 
between Taiwan and the Mainland in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
 
Initial Conditions and the Transactions Costs of Intermediation
 
What influences might the different initial conditions outlined above have
 
had on 
the divergent patterns of expansion of traders and small manufacturers
 
in Korea and Taiwan? As a prelude to answering this question, it is necessary
 
to explore in more detail 
 the character of the transactions costs of
 
intermediation between traders and manufacturers, and lay out what limited,
 
indirect, evidence is available on differences between Korea and Taiwan in the
 
levels of these costs.
 
The transactions costs of intermediation are taken here to include the
 
costs of search for potential suppliers of footwear, the 
costs of negotiation
 
with respect to price, quality and the timing of delivery, and the costs of
 
monitoring to ensure the timely delivery of a product of adequate quality. One
 
influence on these transactions costs -- the number of footwear
 
manufacturers 
-- has already been identified: As the double-lined arrows in 
Figure 2 suimnarize, it was via the effect on the number of manufacturers and 
thus the transactions costs of intermediation that the different degrees of 
32 For evidence of the incomplete development of a monetary conomy in 
the 19th century, see Pallais (1975), quoted in Cole and Park (1980) p. 42; and
 
Amsden (1988, forthcoming); also Won in Chun (1982) pp. 57-85.
 
Figure 2: Intermediation and Industry Structure 
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subdivision of large orders 
were 
modelled to have their divergent impacts on
 
the pattern of industrial expansion.
 
Recall that equation (4) in 
the formal model included the variable X, a
 
vector of influences on transactions 
 costs aside from the influence of the
 
number of manufacturers. Two 
 relevant influences are 
the supply of efficient
 
indigenous staff to run 
a local office and the negotiating experience 
of
 
manufacturers. The availability of 
an efficient indigenous staff is a crucial
 
determinant of transactions costs insofar as (the case in both and
Taiwan 

Korea) barriers of language 
and culture inhibit traders headquarte±red in the
 
importing nation from dealing directly with 
small and mediun manufacturers.
 
Insofar as negotiation 
is a skill that is learnt-by-doing, and that has
 
positive as as
well zero-sum 
elements, producers that are more experienced 
negotiators 
-- and thus have a more accurate 
perception of the objectives and
 
requirements of buyers 
 also are likely to be more efficient negotiators,
 
with a concomitant reduction in transactions costs. As line 6 in Figure 2
 
summarizes, the higher levels of income per capita and education in Taiwan than
 
in Korea together suggest 
that the costs of acquiring efficient indigenous
 
staff were lower, and the 
 efficiency of negotiations between buyers 
and
 
manufacturers greater, 
 initial
at the stages of outward oriented
 
industrialization in Taiwan than in Korea.
 
There is some indirect evidence 
which at least hints at unusually high
 
transactions costs foreign
for traders in Korea in the 1960s
late and early
 
19 70s. A feature of Table 2 that 
has not been noted explicitly thus far in
 
this 
paper is the decline between 1976 and 1981 in the share of value added in
 
the Korean footwear industry produced by establishments 
with 500 or more 
workers -- from 89.9% to 80.5% of the total. As Table 9 reveals, this trend
 
Table 9 : Industry Concentration in the Korea Footwear Industry,1979-1985
 
1979 1980 191 
 1982 1983 1984 
 1985
 
Percentage
 
Annual Prod.
 
By largest 22.0% 21.9% 
 20.9% 21.1% 18.7% 
 18.0% 12.9%
 
fi±rm
 
Firm 61.4 
 55.1 52.1 47.9 40.3 36.0 31.9
 
firm 
 83.1 
 82.0 
 78.3 
 68.9 
 60.7 
 53.0 
 47.8
 
Source 
: Korea Footwear Export Association
 
Notes: I/ Production is measured by number of pairs of shoes produced
 
52.2 
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away from the largest firms accelerated in the early 1980s: in 1979 Che four
 
leading firms accounted for 61.4 percent of total shoes produced in Korea; by
 
1985 this share had fallen to 31.9 percent. Over the same period, the share of
 
production from all firms but the twelve largest rose from 16.9 pex-ent to 

percent. In part, the retreat of large firms is for reasons entirely unrelated
 
33 
to the issues explored in the present paper.
 But at least to some degree,
 
increased participation on the part of smaller manufacturers was the result of
 
increased procurement from Korea by foreign traders. And 
this increase in
 
procurement appears to have been at 
least in part a consequence of declines in
 
the transactions costs of intermediation in that country.
 
The data in Table 3 show a sharp increase in the early 1980s in the number
 
of traders in footwear in Korea. This pattern is paralleled by an upsurge in
 
the number of foreign 'uyers and traders of footwear with offices in Korea.
 
According to one estimate, 34 
as of 1979 there were only ten buying offices (of
 
both direct buyers and traders headquartered in the USA) in Pusan, the Korean
 
city where the ov.erwhelming majority of export footwear is manufactured; by
 
1984 the nunber of registered buyers had risen to 90, and by 1986 to 150.
 
The suddenness of the increase is in large part a result of the abrogation
 
in 1981 of an Orderly Marketing Arrangement that was imposed in 1977 and
 
33 These include changes in credit markets, in the extent of vertical
 
integration in production and thus in obstacles to entry by small firms, and
 
changes in world patterns of demand for footwear.
 
34 provided by a long-time director of one of the largest footwear
 
manufacturers in Korea. Given the ambiguities noted earlier, it is uncertain to
 
what degree these buying offices are accounted for in Table 4, or represent
 
traders additional to those counted in the table.
 
-- 
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restricted access of Korean firms to the USA footwear market.35 But, aside from
 
the relatively increase the number of
small in Korean manufacturers, other
 
longer-terr declines over the course of the 1970s in the transactions costs of
 
procuring exports from Korea are likely to have paved the way for the upsurge
 
in entry by foreign traders.
 
The 1970s was a time of enormous expansion of Korean exports -- from a total 
export value of $1 billion in 1970 to $10 billion by 1977. This general
 
expansion brought in its wake a heightened awareness within Korea generally of
 
what was involved in production for the export market, a surge in the number of
 
Koreans able to communicate in English, and a proliferation of hotels, food and
 
places of residence with which travellers from Western nations would feel
 
comfortable. Thus -- to make explicit the link to the present analysis there
 
was a decline in both perceived and actual unfamiliarity of Korea on the part
 
of foreign buyers, foreign buyers and traders increasingly were able to hire
 
Korean staff familiar with the footwear industry (some staff were bid away from
 
manufacturers) and conversant in English, and the efficiency of negotiations
 
between buyers and manufacturers rose as manufacturers (both actual and
 
putative) learned what the requirements were for successful participation in
 
the international :.arketplace.
 
Export traders need not, of course, have their headquarters outside of the
 
exporting nation itself: export traders indigenous to the manufacturing nation
 
might also serve to open channels to foreign markets. The different historical
 
35 Between 1977 and 1981 the Korean Footwear Exporters Association (KFEA)

allocated quotas to its members, almost entirely on the basis 
of historical
 
performance. Thus over the almost five-year period of the OMA there were few
 
opportunities for entry and export 
on the part of smaller manufacturers. There
 
is, however, no evidence that the KFEA hindered entry by new footwear
 
manufacturers prior to the imposition of the OMA.
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circumstances of Korea and Taiwan point to the possibility (summarized by line
 
7 in Figure 2, and the variable H in equation (3) earlier) that for reasons
 
additional to any differences in transactions costs, the supply of indigenous
 
export traders at the initial stages of outward-oriented industrialization was
 
larger in Taiwan than in Korea. Table 10 provides evidence of the
 
substantially greater role of indigenous 
export traders in trle footwear
 
industry in Taiwan than in Korea. 72.4% of the 844 Ta*wanese survey respondents
 
-- but none of the Koreans -- reported that domestic traders handled 50 percent
 
or more of their exports. Foreign buying offices accounted for 50 percent or
 
more of the export business of only 17.5% of the Taiwanese firms, but of
 
thirteen of the fourteen Korean respondents. It is certain that the figures for
 
Taiwan grossly overestimate the percentage of 1985 export value that was
 
handled by domestic traders insofar as their role tends to be greatest for the
 
smallest and lowest quality manufacturers.36 And the Korean data come from a
 
small and somewhat biased sample, and thus are indicative at best. Even so, the
 
data in Table 10 are sufficiently divergent to warrant some confidence that
 
there have been differences in the supply responses of indigenous export
 
traders in Korea and Taiwan. 37
 
36 Thus, in interviews estimates of the percentage of sales value to the
 
United States (which in 1985 accounted for 71 percent of total value of Taiwan
 
footwear exports) that was handled by Chinese traders ranged from 5 percent

(the estimate of a large independent trader headquartered in New York; in 1986
 
this trader shipped $125 million worth of shoes from Taiwan) to 50 percent (the
 
estimate of of larger 1986 were $30
one the -- exports valued Lt million--
Chinese trading companies). I incline to an estimate in the 10-20% range for 
the USA market, with a far higher market share for Chinese traders for exports 
to markets other than the USA. 
37 It is perhaps worth noting that in 1976 the Korean government began to
 
promote national General Trading Companies along the Japanese model. However,
 
these GTCs have provided few benefits for small manufacturers. For one thing,

Korea's GTCs have functioned largely as trading vehicles for the production of
 
the largest conglomerate groups (at least three major footwear manufacturers-­
TablelO: The Channels of Export of Taiwanese Footwear Manufacturers 19851/
(% of Total respondents to survey in each country who exported
through the various channels)
 
Channel
 
Direct Exports by Factory 
 Korea 
 Taiwan
 
Accounted for some posi­tive fraction of total 
 64.3% 
 27.4%
export value
 
Accounted for 20 percent
or more of total export 35.7 
 11.8

value
 
Accounted for 50 percent
or more 
of total export 14.3 
 7.0

value
 
DomesticTradingCmpn 
as intermediary5
 
Accounted for some posi­tive fraction of total 
 57.2% 
 88.4%

export % 
ue
 
Accounteu 
for 20 percent

or more 
 21.4 
 79.0
 
Accounted 
for 50 percent
 
o mo e0.0
or more
 72.4
Foreign Buying Office or Trading Company as 
Intermediary
 
Accounted for some posi­tive fraction of total 
 l00.,Q% 
 46.8%
 
export value
 
Accounted for 20 percent
 
or more 00.0 25.2
 
Accounted for 50 percent

or more 
 I 
 92.9 
 17.5
 
Sources: Results of 
a survey of 896 firms(844 respondents) conducted for
the preparation of Ministry of Commerce and Taiwan Footwear
Manufacturers Association,Republic 

of China,Analysis of Footwear
Industry (September,1986) p.90; and from 11 
respondents to 
a survey
mailed to 45 small and medium Korean firms,plus three 
medium-sized
interviewees
 
Notes: 
I/ The small (and perhaps biased) sample of Korean firms implies
that the Korean results should be viewed only as 
indicative. Only
members of the Korean Footwear Exporters Association were
Although KFEA members account for over 90 percent of Korean 
surveyed.
 
foot­wear exports,the smallest Korean exporters are not association members,
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A Counterfactual Analysis
 
The argumentation and evidence above point to an entirely straightforward
 
set of logical linkages -- summari.zed by lines 6, 7, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 2
 
-- between different initial conditions and the divergent patterns of
 
expansion of traders and small manufacturers. The facts, however, are not
 
consistent with the implied hypothesis that the expansion of footwear exports
 
in Taiwan was set in motion by the early entry of export traders on that
 
island. Rather, as was suggested earlier (and was confirmed unanimously by
 
interviewees who had participated in the Taiwanese footwear industry in its
 
initial export efforts), the shift of production from Japan was the common
 
initial impetus for expansion in both Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, as the forma]
 
model has demonstrated, the difference in the degree of subdivision of these
 
initial orders (a consequence, as suggested earlier, of different incentives
 
for firm expansion) is sufficient to account for the subsequent divergent
 
patterns of expansion in the two nations. Thus, the proposition that
 
differences in initial conditions were important in accounting for the
 
divergent subsequent patterns of expansion in Korea and Taiwan must
 
necessarily rest on the answer to a counterfactual question: What would have
 
been the trajectory of expansion of the footwear industry in Korea in the
 
absence of incentives for individual firms to maximize the value of their
 
exports?
 
One possibility that cannot be ruled out is that, absent incentives, the
 
Kukje, Samhwa and Hwasung -- have at one time or another been desigLnated as 
GTCs). For another, given their enormous size, insofar as they do provide 
marketing support for independent producers, these producers are like.- to 
themselves be relatively large in size. For details of the behavior of the 
Korean General Trading Companies, see Cho (1987).
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course of expansion in Korea would have been identical to that which transpired
 
in Taiwan. It seems more plausible, however, that in the absence of
 
incentives for expansion individual the
the of firms, growth of the Korean
 
footwear industry would have been slower 
 than was in fact achieved.
 
For one thing, in the absence of incentives Korea is likely to have been a
 
higher-cost source of footwear than Taiwan. As outlined earlier, footwear
was 

manufacture appears to be characterized by some, limited, diseconomies of
 
large-scale. Yet, line
as 8 in Figure 2 summarizes, in the face of high
 
transactions costs of intermediation large-volume buyers would have had less
 
incentive to subdivide their orders 
in Korea than in Taiwan. 38 The nett effect
 
is that, absent incentives for large firms, the flow 
 of orders in large volume
 
38 Formally the cost minimization problem of a foreign buyer that has to
decide in how many plants to place 
an order can be written as:
 
MIN C - Cl + C2
 
Cl - Cl(Q,L) d/dQ < 0; d/dL > 0
 
C2 - C2(L, TC) d/dL, d2L/dL2 < 0; d/dX > 0
 
where
 
C - total costs
 
Cl - direct costs of production
 
C2 - factory/buyer transactions costs 
Q - volume of order 
L - number of lasting lines per factory that receives order. 
Applying the first order condition yields:
 
dCl/dL 
- -dC2/dL.

Costs are minimized by subdividing an order to 
the point where the increase in
 
transactions costs as 
a result of additional subdivision offsets the gains of

the more efficient span of control of small and medium producers.

Using the implicit function rule, it is possible to derive the comparative

static properties of equation (12) as transactions costs vary:
d_[,= - dC2/dLdTC 
_
 
dTC (d2Cl/dL2 + d C2/dC2 )
A simplifying assumption of a linear increase in production costs withincreases in the number of lines per factory implies that d2Cl/dL 2 equals zero.
 
And d2C2/dLdTC is necessarily positive insofar as a change in transactions
 
costs implies by definition a change in the same direction in the marginal

costs of dealing with one additional factory. Thus dL/dTC has a negative sign.

As transactions costs 
rise there is a decrease in the number of factories into

which an order of 
 given volume will be subdivided.
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into Korea is likely to have been smaller than transpired in practice.
 
For another thing, even if we assume 
that, notwithstanding the above, the
 
Japanese nonetheless transferred production 
to Korea (but, counterfactually,
 
subdivided their 
 orders among multiple, smaller manufacturers) the cumulative
 
response is likely to have been smaller than was the case in Taiwan. The key
 
here is the likelihood that, as 
suggested earlier, the supply responsiveness
 
of traders depends on more than merely the entry of added manufacturers. If,
 
for example, the costs of recruiting reliable, bilingual employees are 
high an
 
expansi.on in the number of manufacturers is less likely to induce entry by
 
foreign traders than it would if the 
costs of recruitment were lower. 39 MOre
 
broadly, Korea's relative backwardness 
 at the outset of outward-oriented
 
industrialization points to the likelihood of a less vigorous endogenous 
response by traders -- and thus a weaker cumulative expansionary process-­
than transpired in Taiwan. 
In all, the counterfactual analysis suggests that incentives for the
 
expansion of large firms secured for 
 Korea a more rapid rate of expansion of
 
footwear production and exports than might otherwise have 
been achieved.
 
Thus, as line 9 of figure 2 implies, the financial incentives of expansion in
 
Korea (and their absence in Taiwan) might themselves be viewed as an endogenous
 
outcome of differences in initial conditions in the two nations.
 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
 
This paper has developed two distinct sets of hypotheses as to the
 
relationship between 
export traders and industry structure. The first set
 
39 Formally, the priori assumption is that the second order, cross­
partial derivative in equation (4) of the model 
 d2TC/dModx < 0.
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highlighted the way in which the interdependence of small manufacturers and
 
independent traders imparts to industrial structure cumulative,
a mutually
 
reinforcing character: the analysis explored how the proliferation of small
 
manufacturers can induce an expansion in the number of traders; 
 how the
 
expansion in the number of traders extends access 
to markets for small-volume, 
heterogenous orders; and how this in demand in inducerise turn can a further
 
expansion in the number of small manufacturers. In this first set of
 
hypotheses, the supply of exporz traders is not taken to be an exogenous
 
determinant of divergent patterns industrial in and
the of expansion Korea 

Taiwan; the point rather is that divergent endogenous responses by traders are
 
important in accounting for the divergent patterns expansion of the
of two
 
nations.
 
The second set of hypothesc3 explored more dicectly the exogenous influence
 
on industry structure of the transactions costs of intermediation between
 
traders and manufacturers (and thence the supply of export traders). As
 
explored above, from this broader context 
the provision of incentives for
 
Korean firms to expand 
can be viewed as an efficient institutional response to
 
a host of market failures 
 at the outset of Korea's outward-oriented
 
industrialization, with associated high transactions costs of export
 
intermediation.
 
Although the 
analysis has focused for the most part on differences in the
 
structure of the 
footwear industry in the two nations, its implications uppear
 
somewhat broader. 
First, it appears relevant to some -- but certainly not all 
-- sectors outside of the footwear industry. It is most directly relevant for
 
sectors in which production is more-or-less scale neutral, although in scale
 
neutral sectors some supplementary supply-side propositions would be needed to
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account for any observed subdivision of orders of large volume. The analysis
 
has no direct explanatory power in sectors characterized by powerful scale
 
economies, insofar as technical conditions of production are wholly determinate
 
of firm size. Insofar as it highlights the demand-side conditions required for
 
entry and expansion in sectors characterized by powerful scale diseconomies,
 
sectors that by defi'nition will be dominated by small firms, the analysis
 
perhaps helps explain why -- other things equal -- some countries are more 
efficient performers in these sectors than others.
 
Finally, and most gunerally, the analysis points to two alternative
 
responses to one of the range of interrelated market failures that potentially
 
confront newly-industriali'.zing nations. One response is to follow the Korean
 
strategy of providing incentives for the expansion of individual firms. Such a
 
strategy, however, carries with it the risk (avoided for the most part in
 
Korea) of fuelling a political-economic process characterized by a high degree
 
of rent-seeking, and associated socially unproductive policies. Thus the
 
alternative response is to endeavor tc promote through policy what was in
 
Taiwan the fruit of history and of fortune. Viewed from this perspective, the
 
promotion of traders emerges as one potential government intervention that can
 
reduce the obstacles to participation by small firms in industrial exports.
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